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INTRODUCTION
Despite some seemingly complex arguments made by the Workplace Appeals Board (the
"Board"), this case is in fact quite simple when stripped down to its essential elements. James
Gray and Michael Lowrey (the "Claimants") were day laborers employed by SOS Staffing
Services ("SOS") to perform assignments at different locations for varying durations. When an
assignment ended, if the Claimants wanted to continue working for SOS, they were required by
contract to call SOS to let SOS know that they were available for another assignment. If the
Claimants failed to call SOS to report their availability for additional work, then pursuant to their
employment contracts, they were deemed to have quit.
With respect to the Claimants' employment with SOS, there are two key facts that are
supported by the record and that cannot be disputed: (1) the Claimants signed employment
contracts in which they agreed, as a condition of working for SOS, to report their availability for
work to SOS or be considered as having quit; and (2) when their last assignments ended, the
Claimants failed to report to SOS that they were available for more work. Instead, they simply
left Utah for Las Vegas, Nevada.
Based on these facts, the only rational conclusion that can be reached is that the
Claimants voluntarily quit their employment with SOS. As such, they would be eligible for
unemployment benefits only if they had "good cause" for quitting or if "it would be contrary to
equity and good conscience to impose a disqualification." There is no evidence of either of these
exceptions, and indeed, the Claimants did not even attempt to make arguments based on these
exceptions. Accordingly, the Claimants are not eligible for benefits because they voluntarily quit
their employment with SOS.

In the face of these simple, undisputed facts, the Board mischaracterizes SOS's position
and makes argumentative assertions about (1) what kind of work the Claimants would have been
given (had they called in) and (2) what a new federal government Program Letter supposedly
requires with respect to employees of a temporary service company. However, the Board does
not know what kind of work SOS had available for the Claimants, had they called in The Board
mischaracterizes and misapplies the Program Letter in an attempt to find support for its view that
any new assignment from a temporary agency, regardless of its character, necessarily constitutes
impermissible "new work," that would allow the Claimants to reject the work and still collect
benefits. On the basis of this convoluted and unfounded argument the Board attempts to justify
its decision granting benefits to the Claimants when they voluntarily and without good cause quit
their employment at SOS.
SOS's position is simply that the Claimants had a contractual obligation to contact SOS
for continuing work when their current assignments ended. By not doing so, the Claimants
terminated their work for SOS. SOS is not arguing, as the Board implies, that its contracts with
the Claimants trump state or federal law, or that the Claimants could have been compelled to
accept new assignments regardless of the nature of the work. SOS agrees that if the Claimants
had called in and SOS had no work for them, they would have been eligible for benefits.
Likewise, if the Claimants had called in, and SOS offered them only unsuitable work that did not
meet applicable government standards, the Claimants again would have been eligible for
benefits. However, neither of these possibilities occurred. Claimants did not call in to inform
SOS of their availability for continuing work. Instead, without notice to SOS, the Claimants
moved to Las Vegas. In short, they quit.
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The Board's initial position was that the Claimants were "laid off by SOS, despite the
fact that SOS did not take any action to terminate their employment. To support this position,
the Board cited its regulatory definition of "new work," but then created and applied a new,
inconsistent definition of "new work" to reach the conclusion that the Claimants were entitled to
benefits. SOS pointed this out in its opening brief to the Court. The Board appears to recognize
that the regulatory definition of "new work" on which it ostensibly relied in its decision does not
support its conclusion. Consequently, the Board has now attempted to take refuge in the
Program Letter as an after-the-fact justification for its decision.
The Program Letter is merely intended to "remind" state agencies that individuals may be
eligible for benefits if they decline work that does not meet basic federal standards of "prevailing
conditions of work." (See Addendum E at 1 to Brief of Respondent.) While the Program Letter
indicates that work offered by temporary service companies should be examined for whether it
meets those standards, the Program Letter does not provide, as the Board suggests, that any new
assignment at a temporary service company automatically and by definition fails to meet federal
standards. By this misinterpretation of the Program Letter, the Board purports to have found a
federal requirement compelling its decision. Such is not the case. The Program Letter's
admonition would only come into play if the Claimants had contacted SOS for continuing work.
In that circumstance, work offered by SOS, like any other employer, would be subject to
"prevailing conditions" scrutiny. The Program Letter in no way supports the notion that a new
assignment at SOS of necessity fails to meet federal standards or that the Claimants are excused
from even having to contact their employer for continuing work. In sum, the Program Letter
does not support, let alone compel, the Board's decision, and the decision remains without
factual basis or legal justification.

L

THE BOARD ERRONEOUSLY CONTENDS THAT SOS RELIED ON FACTS
NOT IN EVIDENCE.
In its brief, the Board erroneously argues that SOS relies on two facts that are not in

evidence. Specifically, the Board contends that the contracts signed by the Claimants are not in
evidence, and that there is no evidence that work was available for the Claimants. Consequently,
the Board argues, the Court must ignore these facts. While the availability of work is not
material (given that the Claimants did not call in), the Board is wrong on both points.
A.

There Is Evidence in the Record That the Claimants Signed Contracts.

The Board made a specific finding that the claimants signed contracts with SOS.1 In its
decision, the Board found that
The following language was on the employment application which
[the claimants] signed: 'I agree to report my availability weekly,
or daily if assigned to jobs on a daily basis. Failure to adhere to
this policy could constitute a voluntary resignation from SOS
Staffing Services on my part.'"
(R. 24; R. 21.)2 Not only did the Board make thisfinding,but it is also the case that there was no
evidence to the contrary: the Claimants submitted nothing to the Administrative Law Judge
("ALJ") on the issue, they did not appear or participate in the telephone hearing before the ALJ,
and they submitted nothing to the Board during SOS's appeal. The Department of Workforce
Services apparently provided the Claimants with copies of SOS's submissions to the ALJ and to
the Board, and gave them opportunities to respond to SOS at both levels. (R. 6, 23; R. 6,20.)

1

SOS is entitled to rely on the Board's factual findings set forth in the Board's decision. The
Board cannot now retract certainfindingsthat it now realizes destroy its argument on appeal.
2

Unless otherwise indicated, references to claimant Gray's record will be cited first, followed by
citations to Lowrey's record.
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The Claimants did not respond and did not contest the fact that they had signed contracts as
presented by SOS.
It is immaterial that the documents proving such facts were not entered into evidence.
Because the proceedings below were administrative hearings, the Utah Rules of Evidence did not
apply, and consequently there was no requirement that "the best evidence" be introduced under
Rule 1002. See Utah Admin. Code R994-406-310(b); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney.
818 P.2d 23, 31 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). SOS's uncontested testimony about the contracts, set
forth in SOS's submissions to the Board, was a sufficient basis for the Board's finding, and
neither that finding nor the evidence supporting it can be ignored.
B.

There Is Evidence in the Record That Work Was Available.

Similarly, there is evidence in the record regarding the availability of continuing work for
the Claimants, had they contacted SOS.3 (R. 5, 21; R.12, 13, 18, 19.) The ALJ, in the telephone
hearing on Mr. Gray's case, did not inquire about this issue with SOS. (Gray R. 11-18.) In Mr.
Lowrey's case, the SOS representative told the ALJ that "there's always work available at our
daily branch." (Lowrey R. 12.) When the ALJ asked if any work went unfilled because Lowrey
did not come in, the SOS representative responded:
That I can't verify. I could surely, if we needed to, get records
from that day to find out if there were any jobs that didn't get filled
in because—we didn't have enough people called in. That could be
verified if needed to be; and I could also probably verify, if needed
be, that based on his skills that he has provided to us, that there
was work available for him that day.

3

As discussed extensively below, the issue of work availability is a red herring that should be
disregarded by the Court. Because the Claimants failed to report their availability, as they had
agreed to do—and thus voluntarily quit their employment with SOS—there was no requirement
that SOS demonstrate that work was available had the Claimants called in.

5

(Lowrey R. 12-13.)4 The ALJ did not respond to SOS's offer to provide such documentation,
although he could have done so if he desired to see the evidence. See, e.g., Grace Drilling Co. v.
Board of Review of Industrial Comm'n, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (after initial
Department determination, employer appealed to referee and referee, during telephone hearing,
requested the employer to provide further documentation). In short, there was undisputed sworn
testimony on the availability of work, and no testimony to the contrary.
Furthermore, the letters submitted by SOS setting forth the reasons for its appeals at both
levels of agency review also state that work was available for both of the Claimants. (R.5, 21;
R.18-19.) That correspondence also constitutes "evidence." See Utah Admin. Code R994-406310(b) ("Oral or written evidence of any nature, whether or not conforming to the legal rules of
evidence, may be accepted and will be given its proper weight.") As discussed above, because
the rules of evidence generally do not apply in administrative proceedings, there was no
requirement that the "best evidence"—the actual documents proving that work was available—be
entered into evidence.
While the Board never ruled on the issue of whether SOS had work available for the
Claimants,5 the only evidence in the record was that SOS had work that would have been

4

Contrary to the Board's assertion in its brief (Brief of Respondent at 6), the SOS representative
did not testify: "I can't verify" that work was available for Mr. Lowrey. She testified that she
could not verify that work went unfilled because of Mr. Lowrey's failure to call in. These are
different points. Obviously, work that Mr. Lowrey could have obtained (had he called in) may
have been filled by another person, precisely because Mr. Lowrey did not request continuing
work.
5

Contrary to the Board's assertion in its brief (Brief of Respondent at 11), the Board never found
that there was no offer of additional work to the Claimants. Rather, the Board ruled, without
regard to the particular facts of the situation, that any work that SOS might have offered to the
Claimants would have been technically "new work" that the Claimants would have been entitled
242478.2
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available for the Claimants, if they had called in. Accordingly, the Court should review the
Board's decision in light of the fact that (1) the Board found that the Claimants signed contracts
requiring them to report their availability for further work or be considered to have quit; and (2)
the uncontroverted evidence in the record is that SOS had additional work available for the
Claimants.
II.

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE BOARD'S POSITION
THAT THE CLAIMANTS DID NOT VOLUNTARILY QUIT.
The "burden of proof in unemployment compensation proceedings is on the claimant to

establish eligibility for benefits." Lanier v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 694 P.2d 625, 628 (Utah
1985); see also Baker Department of Employment Sec, 564 P.2d 1126, 1127 (Utah 1977)("The
initial and continuing burden of proof to establish eligibility to receive benefits was upon the
plaintiff"). In the context of the case at hand, this burden required the claimants to show that
they did not leave work voluntarily. See Lanier 694 P.2d at 628; Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4405(1). The Utah Supreme Court has defined the word "voluntarily" as meaning "at the volition
of the employee, in contrast to a firing or other termination at the behest of the employer." Allen
v. Department of Employment Sec, 781 P.2d 888, 890 (citation omitted); see also Professional
Staff Management, Inc. v. Department of Employment Sec, 953 P.2d 76, 78 (Utah Ct. App.
1998) ("Voluntarily leaving work means that the employee severed the employment relationship
as contrasted to a separation initiated by the employer.")6 The "test for voluntariness in leaving

to reject and still receive unemployment benefits. (R. 25; R.22). This argument is discussed in
Section IV below.
6

There are two exceptions to the rule that an employee may not voluntarily quit his employment
and remain eligible for benefits. An employee may voluntarily quit his employment and collect
unemployment benefits if the quit was for "good cause" or under "circumstances of such a nature
7

employment is not the willingness of the employer that the unemployment claimant continue
working, but rather the willingness of the claimant to continue. Allen, 781 P.2d at 891 (emphasis
in original) (holding that even though Department of Security found that the claimants had been
reduced in force, they left their employment of their own free will and it was thus immaterial
whether the employer offered to have them continue employment).
In the instant case, there is not one shred of evidence in the record to support the
conclusion that SOS initiated the Claimants' separation. The Board found that the Claimants
never reported their availability to SOS for additional work. (R. 20, 24; R. 17, 21.) In addition,
the Claimants never claimed that SOS took any action towards them to end their employment.
(See, e.g., R. 4; R. 4.) There is simply no evidence supporting the Board's conclusion that SOS
laid off the Claimants. It is immaterial that SOS did not contact the Claimants to inquire of them
whether they wanted additional work because the test for voluntariness is the willingness of the
employee to continue working—"not the willingness of the employer that [the employee]
continue working." Allen, 781 P.2d at 891. In any case, SOS was entitled to rely on the
Claimants' agreement to call in when they needed and wanted continuing work.
The Board argues that because the Claimants' current assignments for SOS ended
"through no fault of [their] own," they are "entitled to benefits." (Brief of Respondent at 18.)
However, the fact that a particular assignment ended did not mean that the Claimants'
employer—SOS—laid them off. The clients of SOS were not employers of the Claimants, and
the duration of an assignment at a particular SOS client did not determine the status of the

that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a disqualification." See Allen,
781 P.2d at 891. Neither of these exceptions applies to this case: no such arguments were made
by the claimants, and accordingly, the agency did not address these exceptions.
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Claimants' employment with SOS. The Claimants' only employer was SOS. The record
demonstrates that SOS did nothing to terminate the Claimants' employment. SOS is not aware
of any authority—and the Board fails to cite any authority—for the proposition that when a
temporary employee's current assignment ends with his/her employer's client, the employee is
considered to be laid off, despite the employee's failure to call in for continuing work when
contractually obligated to do so.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that (l)the Claimants agreed, by contract, to report
their availability to their employer or be considered to have voluntarily quit (R.24; R.21); (2) the
Claimants failed to report to their employer that they were available for more work (R. 20, 24;
R.17, 21); and (3) nothing in the record contradicts these critical facts.

Accordingly, the

Claimants failed to meet their burden of proving that they did not voluntarily resign. The Board
erred in awarding benefits because its determination that the Claimants did not voluntarily quit
was not based on any evidence in the record and was therefore arbitrary and capricious.
III.

THE
BOARD
IMPERMISSIBLY
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS.

IGNORED

THE

CLAIMANTS'

The Board committed legal error by failing to enforce the Claimants' employment
contracts with SOS. The Board found that the Claimants had signed contracts in which they
agreed to report their availability for work, and would be deemed to have quit if they failed to do
so. (R. 24; 21 .) The Board also found that the Claimants did in fact fail to report their
availability. (R. 20, 24; R. 17, 21.) Yet, despite these findings, the Board ignored the signed
contracts as well as the Claimants' failure to abide by the contract terms.
The law requires courts to enforce contracts unless they are unconscionable. Woodhaven
Apartments v. Washington. 907 P.2d 271, 274 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995) ("[i]t is not for the courts to

9

assume the paternalistic role of declaring that one who has freely bound himself need not
perform

"); Russell v. Park City Utah Corp.. 548 P.2d 891 (Utah 1976) ("Parties are free to

contract according to their desires in whatever terms they can agree upon; and further, . . . the
contract should be enforced according to its terms."); Resource Mg't Co. v. Weston Ranch &
Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985) ("it is not for the courts to assume the paternalistic
role of declaring that one who freely bound himself need not perform."); Bekins V Ranch v.
Hutch, 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983) ("it is the duty of the court to enforce voluntary contracts.").
SOS was entitled to rely on its contracts with the Claimants, and to expect them to call in
for continuing work if they wished to continue their employment with SOS. As a practical
matter, SOS cannot contact each of its thousands of employees to see if they wish to continue to
work.

Contractually, SOS had no obligation to contact the Claimants to check on their

availability for further work, as the Board seems to believe. The Board committed legal error by
finding that the Claimants did not call SOS for additional work, as they were contractually
obligated to do, and yet concluding that the Claimants did not voluntarily quit.
In its brief, the Board attempts to get around the fact that the Claimants failed to fulfill
their contractual obligation to contact SOS by making several speculative "what i f arguments
that have no bearing on the instant case. First, the Board argues that "[a] contract requiring an
employee to report to the temporary employment office daily, even when there is no work
available and the employee is offered no pay for showing up, does not prevent an employee from
receiving unemployment benefits if he is able and available for work and actively engaged in a
search for new employment." (Brief of Respondent at 8.) This argument is pointless. SOS's
contract did not obligate the Claimants "to report to [SOS's] office daily, even when there is no
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work available." Moreover, SOS does not dispute that if the Claimants had called SOS and if no
work was available, they would be eligible for benefits.
Second, the Board argues that "[n]o contract should be upheld which restricts a
claimant's ability to widen his job search to more than one 'employer.'" (Brief of Respondent at
20.) The Board again cites no authority for this proposition. In any case, SOS's contract with
the Claimants did not restrict their ability to search for other jobs. All that they were obligated to
do was to call in for work (if they wanted to continue to work), or be deemed to have quit.
Third, the Board makes several alarmist assertions, such as "enforcing the 'contract' with
SOS would require a finding that Messrs. Gray and Lowrey waived their rights to unemployment
benefits and would therefore be void under both State and Federal law," and to "enforce this
contract would subject an individual to servitude." (Brief of Respondent at 21.) The Board
provides no authority for these outlandish propositions. The fact that the Claimants were
required to call in to report their availability for continuing work did not require them to waive
any rights and did not subject them to "servitude." No law or regulation prohibits a temporary
staffing agencyfromrequiring its employees to report their availability for work or be considered
to have quit. In fact, requiring employees of temporary employment agencies to report their
availability for work or be deemed to have quit is such a rational procedure that at least one state
has codified this requirement in its Unemployment Compensation Act. Specifically, Delaware
law states:
A temporary employee of a temporary help firm will be deemed to
have voluntarily quit employment if the employee does not contact
the temporary help firm for reassignment upon completion of an
assignment. Failure to contact the temporary help firm will not be
deemed a voluntary quit unless the claimant has been advised of
the obligation to contact the firm upon completion of assignments
and that unemployment benefits may be denied for failure to do so.
^A^AIQ

">
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See 19 Del. C. § 3327(b).
In sum, the contract that the Claimants signed with SOS was reasonable, indeed quite
ordinary. It was not unconscionable and did not violate state or federal law. Accordingly, the
decision by the Claimants not to contact SOS for continuing work, but instead to move to Las
Vegas, constituted a voluntary quit, making them ineligible for benefits.
IV.

THE BOARD'S ARGUMENT THAT ANY ADDITIONAL WORK FROM SOS
NECESSARILY WOULD HAVE BEEN "NEW WORK" THAT THE
CLAIMANTS COULD HAVE REJECTED IS ENTIRELY MISGUIDED.
The Board argues that any work that the Claimants might have received at SOS, after

their current assignments ended, would have been so-called "new work," which the Claimants
could have rejected for any reason and still received unemployment benefits. According to the
Board's position, the Claimants would be eligible for benefits regardless of the nature of the
work and even if there was no interruption to the continuity of the Claimants' work. There is no
basis for the Board's position.
A.

The Board's Decision Invoked, but Disregarded the Regulatory Definition of
"New Work."

The Board originally ruled that the Claimants were entitled to benefits because even if
SOS had additional work available for them, it would necessarily have been "new work"
entitling the Claimants to benefits.7 (R. 25; R. 22.) The Board set forth the state regulatory
definition of "new work," i.e., work which an individual is entitled to refuse and still receive
benefits:

7

Although the Board states in its decision that "[t]he Administrative Law Judge found that the
'other assignments' constitute new work under the rules," the ALJ made no such finding. The
ALJ never mentioned "other assignments" or "new work" in his decision. (R. 19-20; R. 16-17.)
Thefirsttime this issue arose was in the Board's decision.
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The applicable portion of the Utah Administrative Code Rule 994405-311 defines 'new work' as 'An offer by an individual's present
employer of duties, terms or conditions different from those he has
agreed to perform in his existing contract of employment.'
(Emphasis added.)
(R. 25; R. 22.)
Under this regulatory definition, a new assignment would only be "new work" if the
"terms and conditions" of the assignment differed from those which the individual "agreed to
perform in his existing contract of employment."

Accordingly, to decide whether a new

assignment constitutes "new work," the assignment would have to be compared to what work the
individual contractually agreed to perform. In the instant case, the Claimants agreed to work for
SOS as day laborers on assignments with SOS clients Therefore, to decide whether a new
assignment would be "new work" for the Claimants, the assignment would have to be compared
to the day labor work the Claimants contracted to perform. The Board did not undertake this
comparison.
The Board ignored the regulatory definition of "new work" and the factual inquiry it
requires. Instead, it changed the definition of "new work" and applied a new definition contrary
to the regulation. Contrary to the language of the Utah Administrative Code quoted above, the
Board ruled that because a new assignment would entail 'duties, terms or conditions different
from' the claimant's previous work assignment (not contract terms of employment), any new
assignment would of necessity be "new work." (R. at 20-25; R. 22.) The Board made no inquiry
or finding about whether the duties, terms, or conditions of a new assignment (assuming the
Claimants had call in for continuing work) would have been different from those the Claimants
had agreed to perform in their existing employment contracts with SOS, which is the relevant
question under the Utah Administrative Code. Instead, by disregarding the regulatory definition

13

of "new work" and creating a new definition, the Board freed itself from ever having to make the
required factual inquiry into the nature of a new assignment, and declared that all new
assignments are of necessity "new work."
The Board's "it must be new work by definition" position is clearly improper.
Additionally, as a factual matter, there is nothing in the record to support the conclusion that
additional work at SOS would have entailed duties, terms, or conditions different from either the
Claimants' previous work or different from the terms and conditions the Claimants agreed to
perform in their employment contracts. Because the Claimants failed to call in, there is no
evidence in the record as to what specific work would have been available had they done so. It
would be pure conjecture to conclude that continuing work at SOS would have been substantially
different from the Claimants' previous work assignments, even if the correct regulatory standard
had been applied.
B.

The Program Letter Does Not Support the Board's "New Work" Position.

In it's opening brief, SOS pointed out that the Board's "new work" conclusion was
arrived at only by ignoring the regulatory definition and creating a new one. Apparently
recognizing that the invoked-but-disregarded regulatory definition of "new work" does not
support its decision, the Board, on appeal, invokes a new purported basis for its decision. The
Board now relies on an Unemployment Insurance Program Letter (Number 41-98) (the "Program
Letter"), which was issued on August 16, 1998, two months after the Board's decision. Even if
this Court adopts the discussion in the Program Letter, which it need not do,8 the Board's "new
work" position is still groundless, and therefore the decision is still arbitrary and capricious.
8

The Program Letter does not bind this Court. See Harrington v. Labor Comm'n, 942 P.2d 961,
965 (Ut. Ct. App. 1997). (choosing to adopt a Department of Labor Program Letter).
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The Program Letter provides "guidance" to the states in interpreting the "prevailing
conditions" requirement of § 3304(a)(5)(B) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. The
"prevailing conditions" requirement provides that an individual is eligible for unemployment
benefits if he refuses to accept new work "if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work
offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in
the locality . . . . " FUTA § 3304(a)(5)(B); Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-405(3)(e).
According to the Board, the Program Letter makes two clarifications that are relevant to
this case. First, that "[n]o contract granting the employer the right to change working conditions
may act as a bar to determining that 'new work' exists." (Brief of Respondent at 12 &
Addendum E at 5). Second, "[a] refusal of temporary work in the form of a new assignment
from a temporary help firm is also subject to the prevailing conditions requirement." (Brief of
Respondent at 13-14 & Addendum E at 9-10.)

While these two points are themselves

noncontroversial, the Board invokes them to arrive at a conclusion which is illegal and
unfounded. The Board argues that it was required to take evidence regarding the work that
would have been available for the Claimants, and "[w]hen SOS was unable to present evidence
that there was a new job available, the Department correctly decided the claimants were eligible
for benefits." (Brief of Respondent at 15.)
To reach this conclusion, the Board makes several unfounded assumptions. First, the
Board impliedly treats the instant case as if it were a "refusal of new work" case, but it is clearly
no such thing. The Claimants did not call in for continuing work and did not refuse work offered
to them. They never called in at all. Nonetheless, the Board repeatedly invokes "refusal"
analysis as if it could somehow apply here. For example, the Board states, "fwjhenever there is
a refusal of "new work" Federal law requires that the Department conduct an inquiry to
15

determine if the new work is 'substantially less favorable' than the prevailing conditions in the
work market." (Brief of Respondent at 8.) Similarly, the Board states, "the employer must
present evidence proving that the new work, which was refused by the employee, meets the
prevailing conditions requirement." (Id.) Also, "[a] person can be eligible for unemployment
compensation if a refusal of 'new work' results in his separation from employment." (Id, at 11.)
There was no refusal of new work in this case, so any inquiry about the nature of new work
would be irrelevant.
Second, the Board assumed that SOS had the burden of presenting evidence on available
jobs even when the claimants failed to report their availability, as required by their contracts.
The Board, however, cites no authority for such a proposition. In fact, as discussed above, the
law requires that the Claimants at all times maintain the burden of establishing their eligibility
for benefits, i.e., that they did not voluntarily quit their employment. There is no requirement
that SOS bear the burden of demonstrating that it had available work that satisfied the
"prevailing conditions" standards when the Claimants did not fulfill their obligation of calling in
for continuing work.
In sum, the Program Letter neither supports nor compels the Board's decision. Given
that the Claimants did not call in even to inquire about continuing work, there was no "refusal of
new work" to trigger a "prevailing conditions" inquiry. Likewise, because the Claimants did not
call in, SOS could not have had the burden of proving what kind of work would have been
offered to them, if they had called in. Accordingly, the Board's assertion that the Program Letter
justifies its decision is incorrect, and the decision remains as groundless as before.
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V.

IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY TO AWARD BENEFITS IN
THIS CASE.
The Board argued that it "would be against public policy to require that a claimant report

to SOS offices daily if there is no work available since they would not receive compensation for
reporting and/or waiting for work." (Brief of Respondent at 17.) This specious argument fails
for several reasons. First, as explained above, all that was required was a quick phone call.
(R. 5, 14, 21, 22; R. 12, 13, 18, 19.) There is no evidence—because none exists—that the
claimants were required to physically report to SOS and wait for work without compensation.
Second, SOS has never argued that the Claimants would not have been entitled to benefits if the
Claimants had called in and SOS had no work for them. Indeed, SOS stated in its appeal to the
Board that if it had had no work for the Claimants when they called in, SOS would not now be
appealing the agency's decision (R. 22; R. 19.)
Also, the Board oddly asserted in its decision that to deny benefits "would require a
finding that no employee working for a temporary employment service could quit that service to
seek full-time employment." (R. 26; R. 23.) This is a groundless argument. The Board
apparently believes that all temporary employees should be able to quit for any reason and
collect unemployment benefits, as long as they are seeking other employment. No other type of
employee can voluntarily quit to seek other employment and still collect unemployment benefits.
To SOS's knowledge, there is no provision in the unemployment statute that provides that
employees of temporary agencies should be treated differently than other employees. In fact, the
statute could not be more clear that an employees who voluntarily quit their employment without
good cause are not entitled to benefits. The Board has now created the "temporary employee"
exception to the law. Thus, the Board's own "policy" arguments fail.
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On the other hand, the Board's decision has significant negative policy implications.
First, the Board has now put an impossible burden on temporary service companies. SOS
employs more than 10,000 persons, and it would be impossible for SOS to contact every
employee to check on their availability. This has far-reaching ramifications for not only SOS
and all other temporary agencies, but also to any party to a contract because it would invalidate
the otherwise reasonable employment contracts. Public policy requires that parties be able to
contract freely and be able to rely on the courts to enforce such contracts. See Woodhaven
Apartments v. Washington, 907 P.2d 271,274 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
In addition, the Board's decision necessarily creates an unbelievably easy avenue to
obtain unemployment benefits. All one has to do is become employed with a temporary agency,
work one temporary assignment—even for one day—and then never contact the agency again.
Under the Board's reasoning, the employee will always be entitled to benefits because any new
assignment that the temporary agency might have had would have been impermissible "new
work."
There is no evidence that the Utah Legislature intended for such an absurd result under its
unemployment benefits scheme. Accordingly, the Board's decision must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Because the Board erred legally and made arbitrary and capricious factual determinations,
SOS Staffing Services respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Board's decision.
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DATED this _day of December, 1998.

W. MARK GAVRF
ANNE W. MORGAN
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner
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Workforce Appeals Board
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140 East 300 South
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Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0244
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